The streams which drain the rugged mountains of central Quang Nam Province
follow the slope of the land toward the South China Sea, growing in size and
strength as they meet other streams. By the time they reach the flat coastal
plain, the streams have become rivers which twist through the populated
farmlands, branching and rejoining again in a crazy patchwork. In every area
through which a river passes, the local Vietnamese give it a name, so that by
the time it reaches the South China Sea, it has acquired many cities along the
way. The river which flows along the southern boundary of Da Nang, separating
the cicy from the fertile paddy region of the coastal plain, is called Song Cau
Do, at least along that particular stretch. About two kilometers south of the river, Highway l forks, sending each of its
branches across the Song Cau Do toward Da Nang on its own bridge. The
easternmost of these, called the Cam Le Bridge, after the hamlet on its northern
side, led directly to the Da Nang Airbase, less than two kilometers away. Two
kilometers upstream from the Cam Le Bridge, to the west, lay a combination
highway bridge-railroad trestle known as the Song Cau Do Bridge.
Marines guarded these bridges, both to prevent VC saboteurs from destroying
them and to prevent enemy infiltrators ftom crossing them with weapons and
explosives for use in the city. The numerous support units stationed in Da Nang
each assumed responsibility for a sector within the city and its suburbs. The
1st Tank Battalion's area included the Song Cau Do Bridge; the 1st Military
Police Battalion's area included the Cam Le Bridge. For the most part, bridge
security consisted of checking the identification papers and packages of
civilians crossing the bridge and keeping a lookout beneath the bridge to foil
sapper attacks. At random intervals, bridge sentries dropped small explosive
charges into the water nearby to discourage enemy swimmers from approaching the
pilings.
At the Song Cau Do and Cam Le Bridges, the duty was routine, the only
excitement being the occasional detention of a Vietnamese whose identity papers
were not in order. South of the river, infantry units of the 1st Marine Division
formed an additional screen protecting the city from major attacks, so it seemed
unlikely that the enemy, in force, would ever get as far as the bridges.
Company D, 1st Military Police Battalion was responsible for security at the
Cam Le Bridge. The company command post was in a bunker at the north end of the
bridge, alongside of which stood an observation tower. An old French bunker and
another observation tower stood at the approach to the south end. Normally, one
of Company D s platoons occupied the bunkers, towers, and several listening
posts and ambush sites on both sides of the river, while the other two platoons
remained in the company's rear area at the edge of the Da Nang Airbase, two
kilometers to the north.
On the afternoon of 22 August, the company commander departed Da Nang for an
"R&R" in Hawaii, leaving his executive officer, First Lieutenant
Michael J. Kelly, in command.* Lieutenant Kelly was scheduled to begin his own
R&R in Hawaii on 28 August, but for the next six days, he would bear
responsibility for the protection of the Cam Le Bridge.16 Unknown to him, during
the early morning hours of 22 August, 80 Viet Cong of the Q. 91 Company, 2d
District, Quang Da Special Zone, in disguise and using forged identification
papers, had individually crossed the Cam Le Bridge, then took a city bus to a
safe house on Quang Tung Street to retrieve previously cached weapons and
equipment and to await the hour for their attack.17
[* Abbreviation commonly used for "Rest and Recreation." Each Marine
was authorized one "R&R" during his 13-month tour of duty in
Vietnam. Many sites were available throughout the Pacific area, including Hong
Kong, Australia, Thailand, Japan, and Malaysia.]
At 2130, responding to reports of movement along the Song Cau Do, Lieutenant
Kelly ordered the 2d Platoon to move from its barracks to reinforce the 3d
Platoon at the bridge. Within an hour, the Marines had reached the bridge and
took up positions on the peninsula that curves out from the north bank to touch
the span itself. At midnight, the Marines of the 1st Tank Battalion who were
guarding the Song Cau Do Bridge, two kilometers to the west, spotted six people
in the water and took them under fire, but because of the extreme darkness,
could not determine whether the fire was effective.18
The Marines at the Cam Le Bridge did not have to wait long for their share of
the action. At 0100, 23 August, Sergeant Larry K. Bucklew, the platoon sergeant
of the 2d Platoon, spotted six sampans crossing the river near his position on
the peninsula. The 2d Platoon opened fire, driving some of the sampans back
across the river, while others pressed on, landing on the north bank.'"
Before the Marines on the Cam Le Bridge could react to the firefight on the
river to their west, exploding RPG rounds and mortar shells engulfed the
security position on the south bank. The 1st Squad, 3d Platoon, under Lance
Corporal Stephen D. Hott, was taken by surprise as Communist troops swarmed over
its position. Lance Corporal Arthur Costello, manning a .50-caliber machine gun
mounted in an old French bunker, tried to get his gun into action, but an enemy
soldier outside the bunker held the barrel fast, and Costello could not bring it
to bear.20
Lance Corporal Hott, in the nearby observation tower with Private First Class
Pedro L. G. Francisco, ordered Costello to disable the machine gun and withdraw.
Hott then grabbed an M60 machine gun and ammunition and ran for the bridge.
Costello, finding the enemy already inside his bunker, fought his way out, then
paused to throw in a fragmentation grenade in hopes of "spiking" the
machine gun.21 Making his way onto the bridge, Costello joined Lance Corporals
John W. Thomas and Hylan L. Crowder running with Hott towards the company command post on the north bank. Francisco was still
on the south side, his fate unknown. The rest of the squad, dispersed in
listening posts and ambush sites near the bridge's southern approaches, remained
in their positions, unseen by the enemy.
[Website Author's note: This .50-caliber machine gun was subsequently used
by the enemy against the Marines and, as noted below, was the source of the bullet
that killed Danny Grimshaw.]
Moments after the Communists struck, Lieutenant Kelly organized a
counterattack from the north bank of the river. Corporal Wayne D. Brown led his
squad across the bridge toward the fight, meeting Hott's squad halfway. Hott had
been wounded in the head, so Brown ordered him back to the command post at the
north end for treatment and, in the confusion, Hott took the machine gun with
him. Unwilling to risk an attack without the machine gun. Brown organized his
men for a defense of the middle of the bridge, using a sandbagged position
already in place, then sent Lance Corporal John A. Eller back for the gun.
Eller returned with the gun, but with no ammunition. Brown himself went back
to the north side, which was now under heavy mortar and rocket fire, and
retrieved the ammunition. Finally ready to counterattack, the Marines charged
across the bridge, hugging the sides for protection as Eller, leading the way,
sprayed the enemy with machine gun fire. Reaching the observation tower, Eller
was felled by a long burst from an enemy automatic weapon. While down, a
ricochet struck him in the chest, wounding him a second time. He tossed a
grenade into an enemy fighting hole, then died.*
[* For his courageous action, Lance Corporal Eller was posthumously decorated
with the Silver Star.]
Within one minute of Eller being hit, Brown himself and two of his men were
wounded. With the machine gun lost and enemy fire mounting. Brown ordered a
withdrawal to the bridge. As the Marines assumed new fighting positions near the
water's edge, the enemy hit them with either tear gas or CS gas**. Only one
Marine in the squad had a protective mask, and the effects of the gas soon made
the position untenable. The Marines withdrew further, to the sandbagged position
in the middle of the bridge from which they had counterattacked. The gas,
although still present, was not as strong there and the men were able to keep
fighting. Brown reported the situation to Lieutenant Kelly. The lieutenant's
response was, "Hang tight."
[**"CS" is the designation of a chemical riot control agent used in
Vietnam. Its effects are similar to those caused by tear gas: burning of the
eyes, throat, and mucous membranes. Although powerful, the effects are
temporary, usually disappearing within minutes of the gas dissipating.]
At that moment, there was little Lieutenant Kelly could do to help Corporal
Brown. Enemy troops on the north bank were pressing hard against the company
command post, advancing under heavy mortar, RPG, and small arms fire. The north
bank observation tower, pounded by Communist shells, collapsed at 0200, burying
three Marines sheltering beneath it, and immediately afterwards, the enemy used
gas against the Marines on the north bank. As with Corporal Brown's squad, the
Marines had no protective masks. Some withdrew to the middle of the bridge where
the gas was not as strong, while others dipped their heads in the water to clear
their eyes and throats, and desperately tried to hang onto their positions.23
While Company D, 1st Military Police Battalion fought to hold the Cam Le
Bridge, the third offensive erupted all over the Da Nang area. The security
force at the nearby Song Cau Do Bridge, although not under ground attack, was
shelled by enemy mortars. Downstream from them, toward the Cam Le Bridge,
Communists continued to cross the river in sampans and the Marines on the Song
Cau Do Bridge kept up steady machine gun fire into the enemy boats. Between 0245
and 0315, 19 units in the Da Nang area recorded over 300 rounds of mortar and
122mm rocket fire detonating on or near their positions. Enemy infantry attacked
the 1st Tank Battalion, three company positions held by the 27th Marines, the
headquarters of the 11th Marines, and three Combined Action platoons in the 7th
Marines TAOR. Many other units received mortar fire. Viet Cong sappers struck
the Special Forces compound two kilometers south of Marble Mountain Air
Facility. Advancing under a mortar barrage, the sappers penetrated the perimeter
and swept through the position with satchel charges, killing 16 Special Forces
and Civilian Irregular Defense Group personnel and wounding 125 more. When
finally driven off, the enemy left behind 32 dead. Later, a prisoner revealed
that this enemy force was a company of the R-20 Battalion, reinforced by a
platoon of the Q, 92 Sapper Company. Their mission was to seize the Marble
Mountain Air Facility and hold it for one day, destroying as many aircraft and
facilities as possible.24
The 2d and 3d Platoons of Company D, 1st Military Police Battalion were still
under heavy attack at the Cam Le Bridge when the 1st Platoon left the airbase
shortly after 0300 to relieve them. Moving in trucks down Highway l, the
rescuers came to a sudden stop after moving only a few hundred meters from the airbase because a battle was raging around the Hoa Vang District
headquarters, which lay along the highway, midway between Da Nang and the north
end of the bridge. A company of the 402dSappw Battalion had assaulted the
district headquarters and blocked movement along Highway l. In their initial
attack, the sappers penetrated the headquarters defenses and were repulsed only
after hand-to-hand fighting inside the compound with U.S. advisors, South
Vietnamese National Police, and even local government officials taking part.'-'
The attack waned at about ()4()(), allowing the relief force to move into the
headquarters where they left eight Marines as reinforcements before continuing
toward the bridge. No sooner had the platoon starred toward the bridge than the
enemy sappers resumed their attack.26
The 1st Platoon reached the river at 04.30, just in time to meet another
enemy onslaught directed against the bridge. From the airbase, a larger,
combined relief force under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. N.
Gambardella, Commanding Officer, 3d Military Police Battalion, moved south
coward the bridge.' This force, designated Task Force Kilo, consisted of two
platoons from the 3d Military Police Battalion; Company K, 3d Battalion, 7ch
Marines; Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion; and Ontos antitank vehicles,
reinforced by a company of ARVN Rangers mounted in armored personnel carriers.
Behind them, crash crews from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing followed with
firefighting equipment, attempting to extinguish the fires caused by the attack
on the Hoa Vang District headquarters.2'
At 0500, Lance Corporal Henry Lowery, leading a nine-man ambush patrol
southwest of the bridge, radioed Lieutenant Kelly that he intended to attack and
recapture the south end. Lowery s squad advanced to within 25 meters of the
south tower, receiving only sniper fire. Two Bell UH-1 Iroquois "Huey"
helicopter gunships appeared overhead and Lowery attempted to signal them to
provide supporting fire on the tower. The helicopters mistakenly attacked the
Marines instead oi the entrenched Communists. With one man killed and two
wounded, Lowery withdrew his squad to the relative safety of a nearby rice paddy
to await help.*
[* Colonel Gambardella, the MP battalion commander, recalled (hat this was the
second call for assistance on the night of 22-25 August. Just before midnight,
he responded to a request for assistance from the commander of the ARVN Special
Forces headquarters in the center of Da Nang city which was under attack. He
deployed two platoons from his battalion who cordoned off the headquarters. Four
of the attackers were killed and two were captured. Col Joseph J. N.
Gambardella, Comments on draft, dtd 16Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File).]
When dawn broke over Da Nang just after 0600, aircraft began attacking the
Viet Cong in the bunkers at the south end of the Cam Le Bridge. The two "Hueys"
were joined by a Douglas AC-^7 Srxx)ky gunship, a Douglas A-l Sky raider, and
McDonnell-Douglas F-4 Phantom jets which unsuccessfully pounded the enemy
bunkers with napalm, high explosive bombs, and cannon fire.29
Counterattack
The infantry unit nearest the south end of the bridge was the 1st Battalion,
27th Marines, with its command post at Duong Son, four kilometers to the
southwest. At 0645, the battalion commander, Major Kenneth J. Skipper, ordered
Company A, located at the battalion command post, to launch an immediate
counterattack to recapture the Cam Le Bridge. Two of the company's three
platoons were already detached, with one deployed to Christmas Island, 1,000
meters northeast of the bridge, and the other supporting a Combined Action
platoon in the hamlet of Lo Giang (l), 1,000 meters southeast of the bridge.
Further, one squad from the remaining platoon was on a patrol, leaving a total
of two rifle squads available to the company. The company commander, Captain
William O. Moore, reinforced these two squads with other members of the company
who were present in the command post. Marines trained to operate mortars, rocket
launchers, and even typewriters suddenly became riflemen again. Said Captain
Moore, "we took our clerks, we took our sick, lame, and lazy, we took
everybody we had and moved out."30 Within five minutes of receiving the
order, the small force was on the march.
Having departed without full knowledge of the enemy situation, Captain Moore
tried to gather information along the way. Passing through an ARVN compound, he
spoke with the U.S. Army advisors who pointed out suspected Communist positions
lining both sides of Highway l. The company continued north along the highway,
stopping outside of Cam Nam, only two kilometers from the Communist positions on
the south end of the bridge. While there, Captain Moore received orders from
Major Skipper to detach yet another squad from his seriously depleted force to
assist the platoon in Lo Giang (l), which had reported being surrounded and
under attack. He sent 16 Marines to reinforce the supposedly beleaguered
garrison and requested permission to proceed toward the bridge. Major Skipper,
however, told him to remain in position and wait for a platoon of tanks which
would support the attack.
The Marines sent to Lo Giang (l) soon radioed back that they had arrived to
find the hamlet quiet, with the Combined Action Marines reporting they had not
had contact with the enemy for three hours. Captain Moore, assuming that someone
had "cried 'wolf,'" asked for the return of the 16 Marines, but Major
Skipper denied his request.
At 1145, the tanks arrived: four 90mm gun tanks and a name tank from Company
B, 5th Tank Battalion. The Marines of Company A had never operated with tanks
before. Indeed, many of those with Captain Moore had never participated as
riflemen in any operation before. Nevertheless, the "company," reduced
in strength once again to two ad-hoc squads, pressed forward toward the hamlet
of Cam Nam on their way to the Cam Le Bridge. The road was raised above the
surrounding paddies with a sharp drop down on both shoulders, so the tanks were
forced to advance in column, with one infantry squad on either side. At the same
time, Company D, 1st Battalion, 27th Marines prepared to attack Cam Nam from the
west.
When Captain Moore and his men were less than 400 meters from Cam Nam, the
enemy opened fire with RPGs, mortars, and small arms. The initial burst killed
two Marines and wounded four others, but the rest continued the attack, firing
and maneuvering toward the enemy, inching forward with only low paddy dikes for
cover. Two hundred meters from the hamlet, an RPG hit the lead tank, causing
minor damage. Captain Moore spotted the RPG and pointed it out to the tankers,
who returned fire with 40 rounds of high explosive, 4 rounds of
"Beehive," and 3 rounds of white phosphorous.31 With this. Communist
troops began to run from one dwelling to another within the hamlet, the tanks
cutting them down with machine gun fire and blasting with 90mm rounds any
structure they entered. A machine gun fired at the Marines from within a straw
hut, and the flame tank drenched the hut liberally with burning fuel. Soon, the
entire hamlet was ablaze, with virtually every structure leveled.
"This," related Captain Moore, "about ended our problem."32
The Communists had blocked the highway with vehicles, which also provided
cover for the enemy. Five more rounds of 90mm fire blasted away this makeshift
obstacle and the tiny force again surged forward toward the Cam Le Bridge. As
they passed through the burning hamlet, the company received word that a platoon
from Company E, 2d Battalion, 27th Marines would soon join them. Captain Moore
ordered his platoon on Christmas Island, which had already made one unsuccessful
bid to recapture the bridge, to join the counterattack from the east.
The .50-caliber machine gun abandoned in the bunker the previous night had
not been destroyed by Lance Corporal Costello's hand grenade and the Viet Cong
now had it in action against the Marines. Even after a fearful pounding by
aircraft, there was no sign that the Communists in the old French bunker were ready to quit. The tanks
led the attack toward the south end of- the bridge, pumping round after round of
90mm cannon fire into the bunker and the nearby observation tower. The accurate,
concentrated fire proved to be too much for the Communists, who rushed from
their positions, attempting to escape. Several of them jumped into a vehicle and
tried to drive away, but a tank fired into the vehicle, sending it up in flames.
Other enemy soldiers leaped into the river and tried to swim to safety, but the
Marines rushed to the riverbank and shot them in the water.
[Website Author's note: This .50-caliber machine gun was the source of the bullet
that killed Danny Grimshaw; see excerpt from Gary Jarvis' book, "Young
Blood: A History of the 1st Battalion,
27th Marines, (Vietnam) 1968" on a companion
webpage. As noted above, viewer discretion is advised in visiting this
webpage.]
At 15-45, nine hours after receiving the order to counterattack. Captain
M(X)re reported to his battalion headquarters that the objective was secured,
then set about reorganizing the position. Several local Popular Force troops
were found under the bridge where they had been hiding since the previous night.
Beneath the tower, the Marines found the body of the gallant John Eller, and in
the vicinity of the bridge, 22 enemy dead. Company A had suffered three dead and
eight wounded. Captain Moore linked up with Lieutenant Kelly's military
policemen on the north bank and his own platoon from Christmas Island, then sent
a squad down the riverbank to the west to ferret out any Viet Cong who might be
hiding there.
Marine C pi Henry A. Casselli. holding his M16 rifle, is seen returning to
the northern end of the Cam Le Bridge over the Can Do River after helping In
secure the bridge. Other Marines cross in the background. An ad hoc force from
the 1st iind 2d Battalions. 27th Marines and including tankers and MPs had taken
part in the fighting.
To the north. Lieutenant Colonel Gambardella's Task Force Kilo fought through
the remnants of the enemy sapper company which had laid siege to the Hoa Vang
District headquarters, reaching the north bank of the river at approximately
1900. Lieutenant Colonel Gambardella recalled that in the attack south to the
Cam Le Bridge, Task Force Kilo came under heavy fire and took several
casualties. In the two fights, the Marines sustained 4 killed and 12 wounded and
the RVN forces with them 3 dead and 21 wounded. Among the casualties was Navy
Hospitalman Allan R. Gerrish, who placed himself between a wounded Marine and
enemy machine gun fire and posthumously was awarded the Navy Cross for this
action. Enemy casualties in the battles for the district headquarters and the
Cam Le Bridge totaled 184. ARVN Rangers took control of the area, allowing
Captain Moore and his company to move to Christmas Island. Although weary from
the day's hard fighting. Company A maintained 100 percent alert in their new
positions."
Through the night of 23-24 August, there were several incidents, relatively
minor as compared to the events of the previous night, indicating that the
"third offensive," though seriously compromised locally, was not yet
over. At 2200, a short firefight erupted at the Song Cau Do Bridge when two
sampans filled with enemy troops attempted to cross the river from south to
north under the cover of small arms fire and a brief mortar barrage. Return fire
directed at the Communist positions resulted in 11 secondary explosions.14
Between 0200 and 0400, over 100 rounds of mortar fire fell on the command post
of the 5th Marines, positions held by Company M, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, and
Battery H, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines."
With the situation in Da Nang restored, it remained for III MAF to pursue and
destroy the escaping Communist units while at the same time remaining vigilant
for another wave of attacks on the city. The heaviest fighting of the
"third offensive" was yet to come.
(the chapter continues...)
